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This Article examines the problems inherent in policing
under laws criminalizing loitering for the purpose of prostitution (“LPP”). LPP laws rely on dated notions of appearance, gender expression, and sexual behavior that are
weaponized against marginalized communities and individuals. New York’s LPP law, enacted in 1976, has a rich history of discriminatory application on the basis of gender,
race, class, and perceived sex worker status.
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A lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of New York’s
LPP law and its enforcement by NYPD recently settled, leading to modest reforms in police procedure. This Article
chronicles the effort to challenge the law, why that challenge
fell short of its goal of eliminating harmful police practices,
and the arrests that have continued to take place since the
procedural reforms. Analyzing post-settlement LPP arrests
where, for example, police allege as a basis for an arrest that
an individual’s “cervix area” was exposed, despite the physical and anatomical impossibility of such exposure, this Article points out how LPP arrests escape scrutiny in the
courts.
Legal challenges fail to create adequate safeguards because LPP arrests are not ultimately about prostitution itself
but instead reflect contestations over control of public space
and women’s bodies. In the end, the law will not fix the problems intrinsic in LPP laws and policing. This is not an area
where tinkering with existing law or practice suffices. Rather, to truly prevent baseless and unjust policing requires a
more radical vision. This Article advocates for an abolitionist approach to the policing of prostitution, which includes
the direct repeal of LPP statutes altogether, arguing that the
only solution is the removal of LPP laws as tools in the police arsenal.
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INTRODUCTION
Deponent states that at the above mentioned date,
time and place of occurrence, he observed the defendant . . . holding her cell phone to her ear while
dancing and shaking her butt towards the street.
Deponent further states that he observed that the defendant was wearing a white shirt which was rolled
up to her breast, exposing her stomach and spandex
pants which were rolled down exposing her buttocks
and cervix area.
Deponent further states that he observed the defendant walking up and down Roosevelt Avenue and approach approximately 5 or 6 single males, grab each
male by the arm and engage them in a conversation.1
Loitering laws that specifically criminalize being in public
spaces for the purpose of engaging in prostitution have a rich history
of discriminatory application on the basis of gender, race, class, and
perceived sex worker status.2 Enactment and enforcement of loitering for prostitution laws are premised on dated and limiting notions
of appearance, gender expression, and sexual behavior3 that are then
weaponized against marginalized communities and individuals.4
Yet, despite decades of American courts striking down vague criminal loitering laws,5 prostitution loitering ordinances have survived,6
1

Criminal Court Complaint at 1–2, No. CR-041477-18QN (Crim. Ct.
Queens Co., Dec. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Criminal Court Complaint, Dec. 12,
2018] (on file with author) (emphasis added).
2
See Karen Struening, Walking While Wearing a Dress: Prostitution Loitering Ordinances and the Policing of Christopher Street, 3 STAN. J. CRIM. L. &
POL’Y 16, 16–20 (2016).
3
See id. at 29–30.
4
See Ginia Bellafante, Poor, Transgender and Dressed for Arrest, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/nyregion/poortransgender-and-dressed-for-arrest.html.
5
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 51, 64 (1999) (“[T]he
ordinance enacted by the city of Chicago is unconstitutionally vague.”).
6
See, e.g., D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 70–73 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (“Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that section 240.37 is unconstitutionally vague.”).
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even though they are just as pernicious in application as other laws
deemed impermissibly vague.
A paradigmatic example of such a law is New York State’s loitering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense
(“LPP”)—Penal Law section 240.37.7 In 2019, a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Section 240.37, and its enforcement by
the New York City Police Department (the “NYPD”), settled and
led to only modest reforms in police arrest procedures.8 Although
unconstitutionally vague, courts sustain LPP laws because these
laws sit at a distinct intersection of gender and the policing of public
space. Factors that courts legitimize as objective, and therefore find
to be safeguards,9 are impossibly and inextricably gendered, racialized, and antiquated. Courts do not take issue with the kind of policing seen under LPP laws because heteronormative and misogynist
reasoning insulates such policing from attack.
This Article chronicles the effort to challenge section 240.37,
and why it fell short of its goal of eliminating harmful and entrenched police practice. It further examines the arrests police continue to make even after procedural reforms. Post-settlement LPP
arrests in New York include instances, such as the one quoted above,
where the police use as a basis for an arrest that an individual’s “cervix area” was exposed—despite this physical and anatomical impossibility.10 The persistence of LPP laws, and attendant arrests,
demonstrate the interplay between gender and petty offense enforcement in ways that demand further consideration. Because LPP laws
allow the policing of gender, appearance, and sexual behavior, LPP
enforcement must be seen as gendered stop-and-frisk.11
7

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (Consol. 2020).
See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, D.H. v. City of New
York, No. 16-cv-07698-PKC-KNF (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2019) [hereinafter D.H.
Stipulation and Order of Dismissal]; see also Matt Tracy, NYPD Loosens Enforcement of Loitering Law, GAY CITY NEWS (June 13, 2019),
https://www.gaycitynews.nyc/stories/2019/13/loitering-law-enforcement-legalaid-suit-2019-06-13-gcn.html.
9
See, e.g., D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 71–73.
10
See Criminal Court Complaint, Dec. 12, 2018, supra note 1, at 2.
11
Stop-and-frisk refers to police encounters on the street that allow a police
officer to detain someone for questioning or conduct a physical frisk or pat-down
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). See also People v. De Bour, 352
8
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Part I of this Article looks at the litigation challenging New
York’s LPP statute and the years of advocacy that preceded the case.
By examining the types of arrests and prosecutions that continue
even after extensive litigation, this Article looks critically at the settlement of the litigation and the enforcement of the statute before,
during, and after the settlement. LPP laws give the police unchecked
discretion to use enforcement as a tool to serve myriad ends. This
can result in arrests, for example, simply because someone has previously been arrested for sex work, arrests that further the investigation of unrelated or unsolved cases, and arrests that force the removal of people from public streets for economic or political reasons.12 It can also result in arrests based only on someone’s clothing
or appearance.13
Part II argues that courts have not, and will not, protect against
the abuses of policing under LPP laws. Either in response to broader
constitutional challenges brought pursuant to impact litigation or in
the adjudication of individual criminal cases, courts rely on a legal
framework fixed on notions of gender and sexuality that preclude
effective safeguards.14 Legal challenges brought in courts fail
N.E.2d 562, 564 (N.Y. 1976). When used with respect to the NYPD, “stop-andfrisk” is meant to refer to a specific policing strategy described in infra Part III.
Of course, LPP policing, unlike the majority of police encounters under NYPD’s
stop-and-frisk regime, results in actual arrests and criminal court involvement, as
opposed to unlawful police harassment that does not result in an arrest. See Adam
Gabbatt, Stop-and-Frisk: Only 3% of 2.4m Stops Result in Conviction, Report
Finds, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2013, 1:18 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/14/stop-and-frisk-new-york-conviction-rate (“[A]round
6% of the 2.4m stops between 2009 and 2012 led to arrests – 150,000 in total.”).
Still, “gendered stop-and-frisk” is an appropriate term because of the parallels in
the unlawfulness of police conduct that generally escapes scrutiny.
12
See, e.g., Struening, supra note 2, at 40–42 (“[R]eporters also speculated
that the enactment of the state’s new anti-loitering law was timed to coincide with
the upcoming Democratic National Convention, to be held at Madison Square
Garden.”).
13
See, e.g., Ricardo Cortés, An Arresting Gaze: How One New York Law
Turns Women into Suspects, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2017/08/nypd-prostitution-laws (“A woman may be surveilled,
searched, and detained, in part because an officer takes issue with her clothing.”).
14
See, e.g., People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (N.Y. 1978) (“[B]ased
on particulars obvious to and discernible by any trained law enforcement officer,
it would be a simple task to differentiate between casual street encounters and a
series of acts of solicitation for prostitution.”).
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because LPP arrests are not ultimately about prostitution itself but
about sexual behavior and who has the right to exist in public
spaces.15 Without question, LPP policing also makes up part of a
broader tapestry of petty offense enforcement that is about social
control and the resulting criminalization of poverty, race, and gender.16
Part III identifies the ways in which LPP laws remain problematic even if there are times when they are not regularly enforced.
While such laws may have fallen out of favor in certain jurisdictions,17 they can reemerge when opportune for the government and
law enforcement.18 The consistent threat of revived enforcement
maintains the oppression of racialized and gendered policing. Part
III also identifies the danger of other efforts to criminalize loitering
for prostitution. Although it may be argued that the solution to the
problems presented by LPP laws, as in so many other areas, simply
lies in less policing and less enforcement, here, less isn’t enough.
Instead, the direct repeal of these problematic laws is necessary. Fortunately, as this Part highlights, a movement is building to do exactly that.
In the end, courts will not fix the problems intrinsic in LPP laws
and policing. This is not an area where tinkering with existing law
or practice suffices. Rather, to address discriminatory and unjust policing, a more radical vision and abolitionist approach to the policing
of prostitution and public spaces is required. An abolitionist approach, as employed in this Article, refers to a commitment to less
law and policing and would necessarily include the repeal of LPP
statutes altogether to remove a powerful and harmful tool from the
“arsenal of the police.”19

15

See Bellafante, supra note 4.
See id.
17
See Struening, supra note 2, at 34–40.
18
See, e.g., Emma Whitford, Surge in Prostitution Related Loitering Charges
Affects Undocumented Immigrants, DOCUMENTED (Dec. 19, 2018, 1:00 PM),
https://documentedny.com/2018/12/19/surge-in-loitering-charges-may-affectundocumented-immigrants/.
19
See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165 (1972).
16
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PART I
Section 240.37 was enacted in 1976 and reads as follows:
Any person who remains or wanders about in a public place and repeatedly beckons to, or repeatedly
stops, or repeatedly attempts to stop, or repeatedly
attempts to engage passers-by in conversation, or repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles, or
repeatedly interferes with the free passage of other
persons, for the purpose of prostitution as that term
is defined in article two hundred thirty of this part,
shall be guilty of a violation and is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor if such person has previously been
convicted of a violation of this section or of section
230.00 of this part.20
Additional subsections of the statute also criminalize loitering
for the purpose of promoting prostitution or patronizing a person for
prostitution.21
Concerns with section 240.37 at the time of enactment are well
documented.22 The constitutionality of the statute was tested almost
immediately upon its passage, a challenge which was successful at
the trial court level but then reversed by the intermediate court and
affirmed by the highest court.23 New York’s Court of Appeals
20

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37(2.) (Consol. 2020).
See id. §§ 240.37(1.)–(4.).
22
See, e.g., Struening, supra note 2, at 40–42; see also Amended Complaint
and Demand for a Jury Trial at ¶ 5 & n.3, D.H. v. City of New York, No. 16-cv07698-PKC-KNF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2017) [hereinafter D.H. Amended Complaint] (quoting Letter from Harold Baer, Jr. to Hon. Judah Gribetz, Counsel to
the Governor (June 15, 1976), which noted that while the “prostitution problem
. . . has reached critical proportions,” section 240.37 is “unconstitutional” and
would invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement) (also quoting N.Y. State
Bar Ass'n, Legislation Report, No. 84 (1976), which showed that section 240.37
has “deficiencies . . . so glaring as to require our disapproval without regard to
questions of the efficacy and underlying policy,” and observed that the law provided a “shortcut” for police because the “standards of probable cause” are
“dropp[ed]” and “[w]omen who are suspected of being prostitutes are arrested on
sight, not because they are committing any unlawful act but because they are considered ‘undesirable’”).
23
See People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1033–34 (N.Y. 1978).
21
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upheld the law in 1978.24 Unsurprisingly, more than four decades of
section 240.37’s enforcement have confirmed that the statute supports problematic policing practices, which has resulted in pronounced disparities in arrests.25
Contemporary arrests mirror those that took place when the law
first went into effect. In 1976, Toni Smith was one of the first
women charged under the newly enacted section 240.37.26 The prosecution alleged that an officer observed her in the early morning
hours on a public street in Manhattan at a location where there had
been numerous previous arrests for prostitution.27 During a brief period, the officer observed Ms. Smith approach three men.28 With the
third man, she entered a building at the location, came out several
minutes later, and was arrested.29 On February 3, 2016, officers from
the 83rd Precinct in Brooklyn arrested Natasha Martin under section
240.37.30 The prosecution alleged that an officer observed Ms. Martin in the early morning hours on a public street in Brooklyn at a
location “frequented by people engaging in promoting prostitution.”31 During a brief period, the officer observed Ms. Martin approach three passersby, after which she was arrested.32
Women of color face disproportionate numbers of arrests under
the law.33 Transgender and gender non-conforming individuals are
also frequently targeted for arrest,34 so much so that the law has been
characterized as a “Walking While Trans Ban.”35 Arrests are based
24

Id. at 1033.
Sex Workers at Risk: Condoms as Evidence of Prostitution in Four U.S.
Cities, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 19, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/19/sex-workers-risk/condoms-evidence-prostitution-four-us-cities
[hereinafter Sex Workers at Risk].
26
See Smith, 378 N.E.2d at 1033.
27
Id. at 1036–37.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 1037.
30
D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 167–68, 171.
31
Id. ¶ 171.
32
Id.
33
Id. ¶¶ 91–95.
34
Id. ¶¶ 71–75.
35
See, e.g., Karina Piser, The Walking While Trans Ban Is ‘Stop and Frisk
2.0’, NATION (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/walking-while-trans-repeal/; David Klepper, Sex Workers Seek End of ‘Walking While
25
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on the clothing people wear, how they look, the streets they stand
on, and who they speak to, rather than any evidence of criminal conduct.36 Men and white women engaging in similar conduct are not
policed in the same way, if at all.37
Despite being a New York State statute, arrests under section
240.37 are overwhelmingly concentrated in the five New York City
boroughs38 (each of which comprises a separate county) and the
NYPD uses section 240.37 overwhelmingly in neighborhoods
where residents are people of color.39 As a result, civil rights and
community advocates have extensively chronicled the damage policing under section 240.37 causes in these largely marginalized
communities.40
In September 2016, a group of women who had been arrested
for LPP offenses in different counties in New York City brought a
lawsuit against the NYPD in the Southern District of New York.41
The plaintiffs in D.H. v. City of New York asserted numerous claims
involving the statute’s enforcement and their own arrests. Most critically, they alleged that section 240.37 was unconstitutionally vague
and overly broad and that the NYPD intentionally discriminated on
the basis of race, gender, and gender identity in making arrests under
its guise.42 They argued that they had been arrested because they
were known to police because they had previously been arrested for
Trans’ Loitering Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 7, 2019), https://apnews.com/2eb3876a208d48929db1c2dae769129f.
36
See, e.g., Piser, supra note 35.
37
D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 98.
38
See Press Release, Cleary Gottlieb & The Legal Aid Soc’y, The Legal Aid
Soc’y & Cleary Gottlieb Challenge the Constitutionality of N.Y.’s Loitering for
Prostitution Law: Demand an End to NYPD’s Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement of the Law Against Women of Color (Sept. 30, 2016) [hereinafter
Cleary Gottlieb & Legal Aid Press Release], https://orgs.law.columbia.edu/qtpoc/sites/default/files/content/LAS-Cleary-Gottlieb-Challenge-theConstitutionality-of-New-Yorks-Loitering-for-Prostitution-Law-Press-Release9.30.16.pdf.
39
D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 97.
40
See, e.g., MAKE THE RD. N.Y., TRANSGRESSIVE POLICING: POLICE ABUSE
OF LGBTQ COMMUNITIES OF COLOR IN JACKSON HEIGHTS 6, 10–14 (2012),
https://maketheroadny.org/pix_reports/MRNY_Transgressive_Policing_Full_Report_10.23.12B.pdf.
41
D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 1–2.
42
Id. ¶¶ 1–10.
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prostitution, were targeted simply for being transgender women, or
that the police used a Section 240.37 arrest to extensively debrief
them about unrelated activity or investigations.43
The plaintiffs exposed how NYPD engages in “sweeps,” multiple arrests at the same time targeted at specific locations and specific
groups of women.44 The complaint also alleged that NYPD routinely
arrests people under section 240.37 without probable cause, often
specifically because of race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, or appearance, constituting a “pattern and widespread practice
of unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, seizures and/or arrests and detention of women of color, including
transgender women, engaged in wholly innocent conduct, such as
walking in public spaces or speaking with other pedestrians.”45
In addition to the facial constitutional challenge to the statute
itself, the complaint identified several elements of NYPD practice
under section 240.37 that violated constitutional standards and infringed upon the putative class’s liberty interests.46 These included
the category of arrests based merely on the fact that the police recognized that an individual had been arrested for prostitution before.47 The D.H. plaintiffs identified this as a “self-perpetuating cycle” that “unlawfully prejudices any woman who has ever been arrested, even if the charges underlying her original arrest were dismissed.”48
Similarly, officers rely on the fact that a location was “prostitution-prone” when making arrests under section 240.37.49 The complaint pointed out that this, too was self-substantiating, rather than
based in objective fact, as arrests were only indicative of where

43

Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
Id. ¶ 9.
45
Id. ¶ 10.
46
Id. ¶¶ 9, 69–70.
47
Id. Plaintiff Sarah Marchando alleged that because of her “long history of
prostitution-related arrests,” police officers “kn[e]w [her] by face and last name”
and “[b]ecause of her criminal record and previous proximity to the precinct, the
police target[ed] [her] for arrest when they s[aw] her outside, and she [was] often
arrested for loitering for the purpose of prostitution when engaged in wholly innocent conduct.” Id. ¶ 220.
48
Id. ¶ 85.
49
Id. ¶ 88.
44

78

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW CAVEAT

[Vol. 74:68

police choose to deploy resources rather than the actual prevalence
of prostitution.50
The plaintiffs also emphasized the unlawfulness of arrests based
solely on an individual’s appearance.51 Pre-printed affidavits used
by the NYPD to document allegations against individuals arrested
for LPP offenses include a box for officers to check that the individual was “dressed in provocative or revealing clothing.”52
All of this taken together vividly demonstrated the problems
with section 240.37 and its enforcement. Plaintiffs offered extensive
evidence demonstrating that, under section 240.37, “women of color
are subject to arrest for innocent conduct in a manner and with a
frequency that others not belonging to this group are not.”53 Yet, as
explored in more detail in Part II, the court dismissed the majority
of plaintiffs’ claims in January 2018.54
A few months later, in June 2018, with the dismissal decision
stayed, the case entered mediation and the NYPD changed its procedures regarding LPP arrests.55 The Department amended its patrol
guide—the internal document governing arrest procedures—to require officers effectuating LPP arrests to provide additional details
regarding the basis for each arrest.56 This was to be a safeguard
against problematic or baseless arrests.57 D.H. reached a final settlement in April 2019.58
50

Id. ¶ 88.
Id. ¶ 86.
52
Id.; see infra Part II.
53
D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 98.
54
See D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
55
See New York City Police Department Patrol Guide Timeline, NYC,
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/Update.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) (stating that § 208-45 was updated on June
11, 2018); see also Emma Whitford, NYPD Amends Patrol Guide to Curb ‘Walking While Trans’ Arrests, QUEENS DAILY EAGLE (June 6, 2019),
https://queenseagle.com/all/loitering-law-transwomen-nypd-amended-profiling.
56
See generally N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, PATROL GUIDE: PROCEDURE NO. 20845—LOITERING FOR PURPOSES OF PROSTITUTION (2020) [hereinafter NYPD
PATROL GUIDE 2020]; New York City Police Department Patrol Guide Timeline,
supra note 55; see also Tracy, supra note 8.
57
Explaining the patrol guide changes, the NYPD indicated its commitment
to “providing clarity to our officers on loitering enforcement.” Tracy, supra note
8.
58
D.H. Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, supra note 8.
51
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The patrol guide changes were not radical. The amendment to
the section governing LPP arrests removed from the list of potential
bases for arrest the language that that someone was a “known prostitute” or “consorts with known prostitutes or pimps.”59 Moving forward, officers making LPP arrests would be required to document
more details of what they observed prior to making the arrests.60 The
most significant change was the addition of a directive that
“[g]ender, gender identity, clothing, and location are not sufficient
alone or together to establish probable cause.”61
Surprisingly, in the months following the patrol guide change,
LPP arrests across New York City began to rise.62 Although arrests
for LPP in New York State had declined significantly from 2010 to
2016, the number of arrests in New York City nearly tripled from
2017 to 2018, the majority of which occurred after the NYPD
amended its patrol guide.63
In December 2018, several months after the patrol guide changes
went into effect, police officers from the 115th Precinct in Queens
made a section 240.37 arrest that was then prosecuted on the accusatory instrument excerpted above.64 Notably, the complaint
charged that one of the reasons arresting officers believed the
woman they arrested was loitering with the purpose of prostitution
was because she wore her clothes in such a way as to expose “her
buttocks and cervix area.”65 A cervix is an internal organ, located on
the lower part of one’s uterus.66 The cervix is not visible unless one

N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, PATROL GUIDE: PROCEDURE NO. 208-45—
LOITERING FOR PURPOSES OF PROSTITUTION (2013).
60
See Tracy, supra note 8.
61
NYPD PATROL GUIDE 2020, supra note 56.
62
See Whitford, supra note 18.
63
Whereas in 2017, the NYPD made 50 arrests under section 240.37, that
number increased to 139 in 2018. See Top Charge PL 230, PL 240.37, ED 6512
Arrests by County, 2009–2018, DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES,
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/stats.htm (accessed Nov. 15,
2019) [hereinafter Top Arrest Charge].
64
See Criminal Court Complaint, Dec. 12, 2018, supra note 1, at 1–2.
65
Id. at 2.
66
See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., COMPREHENSIVE CERVICAL CANCER
CONTROL: A GUIDE TO ESSENTIAL PRACTICE 32 (2d ed. 2014),
59
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conducts an internal examination with a speculum.67 A police officer
could not observe one’s cervix on the street, even if a person were
wearing nothing below the waist.68
Nonetheless, these purported police observations led to an arrest
for LPP.69 A search incident to that arrest yielded a glass pipe with
a small amount of cocaine residue, resulting in additional drug
charges.70 As the arrest made its way through the criminal legal system, a prosecutor drew up the accusatory instrument commencing
the prosecution based on the police paperwork and included the allegation of the exposed cervix,71 despite its factual impossibility.72
Next, a local criminal court arraigned the arrested an individual on
this accusatory instrument.73 Ultimately, the prosecution of the misdemeanor Section 240.37 charges required over a dozen appearances in court and, most significantly for the individual arrested,
also included a short period of incarceration.74
Putting aside issues of basic anatomy, this arrest and prosecution
demonstrate several of the well-documented and widespread issues
inherent in the policing of loitering for prostitution.75 LPP laws center on the criminalization of appearance, gender expression, and perceived sexual behavior further complicated by unavoidable issues of
race and class.76 The notion that dancing, shaking a body part, or
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/144785/9789241548953_eng.pdf;jsessionid=3E18E8DDC37D2D317C3507E9BB3EBE91?sequence=1 (“The lower
part of the cervix (ectocervix) lies within the vagina and is visible with a speculum; the upper two thirds of the cervix (endocervix) lies above the vagina and is
not visible.”).
67
Id.
68
See id.
69
See Criminal Court Complaint, Dec. 12, 2018, supra note 1, at 1–2.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 66, at 32.
73
See Appearance History, No. CR-041477-18QN (Crim. Ct. Queens Co.,
Dec. 12, 2018) (on file with author).
74
See id.
75
See, e.g., Cleary Gottlieb & Legal Aid Press Release, supra note 38;
Melissa Gira Grant, The NYPD Arrests Women for Who They Are and Where They
Go — Now They’re Fighting Back, VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/11/22/the-nypd-arrests-women-for-whothey-are-and-where-they-go-now-theyre-fighting-back/.
76
See Cleary Gottlieb & Legal Aid Press Release, supra note 38.
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attempting to talk to people of one gender on the street gives rise to
probable cause for loitering with the purpose of prostitution is
astounding. Yet, arrests are often premised on even fewer facts than
those in the Queens accusatory instrument.77
An analysis of arrest data and court documents from nearly fifty
LPP arrests in the four months immediately following NYPD’s patrol guide amendment illustrates the concrete dangers of ongoing arrests and prosecutions under section 240.37.
Over half of the charging documents reference the arrested individual’s clothing, even though the amended patrol guide specifically
prohibits the consideration of clothing,78 either together with other
factors or alone, as probable cause that someone is loitering for the
purpose of prostitution.79 Among the clothing alleged to be probative of criminality, police officers noted a “black jacket, blue jeans,
and grey boots,”80 a “sleeveless black dress,”81 or a “red and black
mini dress and a beige cardigan” that the arresting officer deemed
“provocative.”82
In various cases, NYPD officers determined arrestees’ purposes
to be prostitution from the fact that they wore “black cowboy boots,

77

See, e.g., Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-040816-18KN (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. Sept. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 7, 2018]
(on file with author) (totality of facts alleging section 240.37 in accusatory instrument that on a “public street, in an industrial area, which is not in front of a bus
stop or other places were [sic] people generally congregate, the [arresting officer]
observed the defendant standing at said location for approximately ten minutes
and further observed the defendant beckoning to passing motorists and observed
the defendant approach three vehicles and moped [sic], of which the occupants
were male”).
78
See NYPD PATROL GUIDE 2020, supra note 56.
79
See, e.g., infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
80
Supporting Deposition at 1, No. CR-046252-18KN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Oct.
18, 2018) (on file with author).
81
Criminal Court Complaint at 2, No. CR-031724-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Sept. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 8, 2018] (on file with
author).
82
Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-032015-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 12, 2018] (on file
with author).
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and black shorts,”83 or “shorts and a tank top,”84 or “a multi color
short dress and sandals.”85 Equally as confounding as the fact that
the clothing someone wears can be the basis for an arrest, however,
is that clothing was cited in over half of the arrests looked at after
the patrol guide was changed to make clear that clothing cannot be
a factor in establishing probable cause for LPP.
The majority of LPP arrests during this period also rely on the
perceived genders of the individuals observed or arrested.86 Almost
all note the fact that the arrestee, a female, interacted with only
males during the period of the officer’s observations.87 Complaints
refer to “lone males” and assert that the person arrested did not speak
to any female passers-by during the observation period.88
Gender stereotypes form the backbone of allegations against individuals arrested for LPP.89 Accordingly, accusatory instruments
rely on several flawed premises to charge LPP—that only women
sell sex, that only men buy sex, and that sex only occurs between
men and women.90 The accusatory framework is strictly heteronormative.91 While this may have sufficed to justify arrests taking place
in the 1970s, when looked at today it grossly misaligns with the understanding of gender, sexuality, and norms regarding behavior in
public as they have evolved.
83

Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-026405-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
July 21, 2018) [hereinafter Criminal Court Complaint, July 21, 2018] (on file with
author).
84
Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-026412-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
July 22, 2018) (on file with author).
85
Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-028516-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Aug. 22, 2018) (on file with author).
86
See, e.g., Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 12, 2018, supra note 82, at 1–2;
Criminal Court Complaint, July 21, 2018, supra note 83, at 1–2.
87
See, e.g., Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 12, 2018, supra note 82, at 1–2;
Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 8, 2018, supra note 81, at 1; Criminal Court
Complaint, July 21, 2018, supra note 83, at 1–2.
88
See, e.g., Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 7, 2018, supra note 77, at 1;
Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 12, 2018, supra note 82, at 1.
89
See Legislative Memo: Loitering Repeal, N.Y. C.L. UNION,
https://www.nyclu.org/en/legislation/legislative-memo-loitering-repeal (last visited Apr. 9, 2020) (“But to make an LPP arrest under § 240.37, they have little to
rely on besides race and gender stereotypes of what a ‘prostitute’ looks like.”).
90
See id.
91
See Bellafante, supra note 4.

2020]

YOUR CERVIX IS SHOWING

83

Further, even crediting that the purpose of an observed interaction may be sexual in nature, these allegations also take for granted
that sex must be commercial—sexual conduct in exchange for a
fee—rather than simply consensual non-commercial sex.92 That
gender and sexual norms could be utilized in this way stands out
more as a relic than an appropriate basis for a criminal prosecution.
Nevertheless, arrests continue.
The wide latitude afforded police officers under section 240.37
and other LPP statutes allows for abuse and targeting. For example,
when police decide to crack down on narcotics activity in a specific
area but fail to make any drug-related arrests, they can turn to the
LPP statute.93 Section 240.37 allows them to detain and question
individuals without having to actually make an arrest for drug offenses, which would require that they recover drugs as physical evidence.94
Furthermore, as argued above, police flout even the minimal
protections intended by any procedural reform.95 In 2015, the New
York State legislature took steps to limit problematic section 240.37
arrests, specifically with respect to police seizing condoms from arrested individuals and using the fact that the individual had condoms
as evidence of LPP.96 It amended the Criminal Procedure Law to
provide that
[e]vidence that a person was in possession of one or
more condoms may not be admitted at any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in a prosecution for section
230.00 or section 240.37 of the penal law for the purpose of establishing probable cause for an arrest or
proving any person’s commission or attempted commission of such offense.97
Police and prosecutors used the fact of condom possession, almost exclusively against women, as a way to show intent to engage
92

See Struening, supra note 2, at 29–30.
See Whitford, supra note 18.
94
See id.
95
See, e.g., supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
96
See Susan Bryant, 2015 Legislative Review, PUB. DEF. BACKUP CTR. REP.,
Jan.-Apr. 2016, at 8, 10–11.
97
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.47 (Consol. 2020).
93
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in prostitution.98 Bearing this out to its logical conclusion, the inference put forward by the NYPD, and accepted by courts adjudicating
LPP cases, was that there was simply no other reason why a woman
would carry condoms unless she was engaging in prostitution.99
Yet, nearly 15% of the LPP cases analyzed in 2018 specifically
alleged condom possession as a factor indicating the arrested individual’s purpose was to engage in prostitution.100 As a result of
NYPD’s practice, both before and after the legislative prohibition,
women who find themselves frequently stopped by the police either
carry fewer condoms or cease to carry condoms at all for fear it
could lead to arrest.101 That men can carry condoms without the
same fear exposes gendered and deeply engrained notions of appropriate sexual behavior. Women are meant to be chaste.102 Any sexual activity should take place inside the home, with a male spouse.103

98

See Sex Workers at Risk, supra note 25 (documenting widespread police
practice of stopping individuals on the street, searching them for condoms and
then arresting them for loitering for prostitution if condoms were found, and specifically noting that “[i]n New York, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles, many
people, particularly members of the transgender community, told Human Rights
Watch they were stopped and searched for condoms while walking home from
school, going to the grocery store, and waiting for the bus”); see also Molly
Crabapple, New York Cops Will Arrest You for Carrying Condoms, VICE (Mar. 5,
2013, 10:36 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3b5mx9/new-york-copswill-arrest-you-for-carrying-condoms.
99
This practice was widely criticized as it jeopardized public health and created an increased risk of sexually transmitted infection. See, e.g., Sex Workers at
Risk, supra note 25.
100
For example, in July 2018, another accusatory instrument supporting a
prosecution under Section 240.37 alleged a factor leading arresting officers to
conclude the individual arrested was loitering for the purpose of prostitution was
that they recovered three condoms from her purse. See Criminal Court Complaint
at 3, No. CR-025820-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. July 24, 2018) (on file with author);
see also Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 12, 2018, supra note 82, at 2 (arresting
officer noted that defendant had thirty-two condoms in her purse).
101
See, e.g., Adam Edelman, Condom Conundrum: New York Sex Workers
Said to Be Avoiding Condoms as They’re Used More Frequently as Evidence of
Prostitution, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 5, 2013, 7:55 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/arrested-carrying-condoms-new-york-article-1.1280431.
102
See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51,
66–67 (2002).
103
See id. at 69.
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Women who carry condoms with them outside the home are deviant,
suspect, and worthy of arrest and prosecution.104
No degree of procedural reform will reduce the harm of LPP policing. Attempts at prohibiting certain evidence from being used
against arrested individuals or amending the patrol guide to preclude
certain factors as the basis for arrest have proven futile.105 Years after both the condom prohibition and the patrol guide amendment,
women still face arrest and prosecution under section 240.37 for
simply standing in a public place and talking to other people.106 Police documents that form the basis of a prosecution still contain
places for officers to indicate provocative or revealing clothing and
condom possession.107 Statutes like section 240.37 serve to further
legitimize and insulate discriminatory police practices.108 As the
next Section details, the unfettered discretion LPP laws bestow on
the police is impervious to challenge in the courts.
PART II
LPP arrests in New York bear out the exact dangers foreshadowed by earlier cases invalidating loitering and vagrancy statutes.
In 1972, four years before section 240.37 was enacted, the Supreme
Court struck down a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance which criminalized and “deemed vagrants”:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go
about begging, common gamblers, persons who use
juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or
pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton
and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places,
common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or
strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly
104

See Edelman, supra note 101.
See supra notes 36–37, 56–57 and accompanying text.
106
Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-042933-19KN (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Dec. 6, 2019) (on file with author).
107
See, e.g., Supporting Deposition – Loitering for Prostitution at 1–2, No.
CR-042933-19KN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Dec. 6, 2019) (on file with author).
108
See Crabapple, supra note 98.
105
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persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and
habitually spending their time by frequenting houses
of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, persons able to work
but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives
or minor children.109
In doing so, the Court warned of making “criminal activities which
by modern standards are normally innocent.”110
On the other hand, the district court hearing the recent constitutional challenge to section 240.37 denied the plaintiffs’ claim that
the statute was unconstitutionally vague.111 Rather, the D.H. court
held that “it constrains police discretion by specifying certain conduct that an officer must observe—conduct which the statute requires to occur repeatedly—and by limiting its reach to conduct
done for the purpose of prostitution.”112 This reasoning echoed the
New York Court of Appeals decision from 1978, which found section 240.37 constitutional and not overly vague:
[B]ased on particulars obvious to and discernible by
any trained law enforcement officer, it would be a
simple task to differentiate between casual street encounters and a series of acts of solicitation for prostitution, between the canvas of a female political activist and the maneuvers of a Times Square prostitute.113
These decisions stand in stark contrast to the long line of cases
striking down ordinances and criminal laws for vagueness.114 New
109

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1 (1972).
Id. at 163.
111
D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
112
Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
113
People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (N.Y. 1978); see also Carmen v.
Carey, No. 78 Civ. 438, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11104, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
18, 1982) (granting dismissal for the reasons given in People v. Smith).
114
See, e.g., Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162; City of Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41, 64 (1999). Courts have also been willing to invalidate laws for vagueness
where they apply to individuals required to register as sex offenders, Valenti v.
Hartford City, 225 F. Supp. 3d 770, 789–90 (N.D. Ind. 2016), or homeless
110
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York’s LPP statute has been distinguished because of its requirement that an arrest be limited to instances where one’s purpose is to
engage in an act of prostitution.115 Frequently referred to as “loitering plus,” it has passed constitutional muster because it has been
taken for granted that the purpose required by the statute is objective
and discernible.116 Yet, the objectiveness that purportedly salvages
laws like section 240.37 rests on gender, appearance, and behavior
in public, none of which is an objective measure of whether someone’s purpose is prostitution.
The NYPD’s arrest practice and the experience of people arrested under section 240.37 undercut the finding that the statute has
safeguards that are objective, specific, or clear.117 In fact, several
individual NYPD officer-defendants in D.H. testified that the language of section 240.37 is “arbitrary,” “subjective,” and not “clearcut,” and that there are no consistent standards governing what constitutes sufficient conduct for an arrest under the statute.118
The presumptions engendered in declaring the “purpose” requirement to be the statute’s saving grace are eerily reminiscent of
arguments the Supreme Court discredited when striking down the
Jacksonville ordinance.119 In Papachristou, Justice Douglas made
clear that the notion that people who “look suspicious to the police
are to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of law.”120
The Court refused to uphold a law on the justification that “crime is
being nipped in the bud” as that was simply “too extravagant to deserve extended treatment.”121

individuals, Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir.
2014). See also Guyora Binder & Brenner Fissell, A Political Interpretation of
Vagueness Doctrine, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1527, 1563–66; Short v. City of Birmingham, 393 So. 2d 518, 522–23 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); City of Akron v. Massey, 381 N.E.2d 1362, 1366 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1978).
115
See D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 72–73.
116
See Smith, 378 N.E.2d at 1036; D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 72–73; see also
Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 129 P.3d 682, 689 (Nev.
2006).
117
See supra Part I.
118
Request for Leave to Amend the Amended Complaint at 3, D.H. v. City of
New York, No. 1:16-cv-07698-PKC-KNF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018).
119
See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171.
120
Id.
121
Id.

88

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW CAVEAT

[Vol. 74:68

The Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of an
individual’s purpose on the street, as ascertained by the police, as a
basis for arrest when it invalidated Chicago’s gang loitering ordinance in 1999.122 The ordinance prohibited “criminal street gang
members” from loitering and refusing to disperse after an officer’s
order.123 Loitering was defined as “remain[ing] in any one place
with no apparent purpose.”124
Evaluating the Chicago ordinance in terms of the notice it afforded members of the public, the Court took specific issue with the
notion that “apparent purpose” could be determined in a way that
satisfied constitutional standards:
It is difficult to imagine how any citizen of the city
of Chicago standing in a public place with a group of
people would know if he or she had an “apparent purpose.” If she were talking to another person, would
she have an apparent purpose? If she were frequently
checking her watch and looking expectantly down
the street, would she have an apparent purpose?125
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to reconcile decisions finding that LPP statutes, and section 240.37 specifically, pass constitutional muster. Somehow, the skepticism regarding the vagueness of
“purpose” and the difficulty of its determination falls away when
courts evaluate LPP statutes.126 Once prostitution becomes the
stated and prohibited purpose, the ability to ascertain purpose is
taken as scientific, infallible and, ultimately, constitutionally acceptable.127
When the purportedly objective elements are deconstructed, the
distinction afforded LPP statutes is exposed as untenable. For example, looking at the impact of clothing as the basis for arrest, the D.H.
court concluded that “[t]he ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for
considering clothing . . . is that the experience of a reasonable police
122
123
124
125
126

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1999).
Id. at 45–47.
Id. at 47 (alteration in original).
Id. at 56–57.
See, e.g., D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 71–73 (S.D.N.Y.

2018).
127

See, e.g., id.
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officer may be that a person seeking to make known to passers-by
their willingness to engage in an act of prostitution will wear certain
types of clothing.”128
The D.H. court accepted the notion that clothing could be dispositive of a willingness to engage in prostitution.129 It did so despite
evidence obtained in depositions that showed wide and unpredictable variation of interpretations of clothing among arresting officers.130 The kind of clothing that officers testified to be indicative of
a criminal “purpose” of prostitution ranged from brightly-colored
clothing, to jeans with rips, to sweatpants.131 As one defendant officer testified, “pretty much anything other than a nun’s outfit” could
be indicative of a section 240.37 violation to police officers on patrol.132
Thus, conferring a level of authority in the evidentiary value of
clothing choice in this way defies common sense, actual practice,
and conflicts with existing caselaw looking at, for example, laws
banning cross-dressing.133 For decades, courts have cast doubt on
the practice of criminalizing certain clothing choices.134 In striking
down a cross-dressing ban in 1975, the Ohio Supreme Court cautioned:
Modes of dress for both men and women are historically subject to changes in fashion. At the present
time, clothing is sold for both sexes which is so similar in appearance that ‘a person of ordinary intelligence’ might not be able to identify it as male or female dress. In addition, it is not uncommon today for
individuals to purposely, but innocently, wear apparel which is intended for wear by those of the opposite sex.135

128

Id. at 76.
Id.
130
See Request for Leave to Amend the Amended Complaint, supra note 118,
at 3 n.7.
131
Id.
132
Id. (citing Deposition of NYPD Lieutenant Dave Siev).
133
See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Rogers, 324 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ohio 1975).
134
See id.
135
Id.
129
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Similarly, a local ordinance criminalizing clothing “not customarily worn” by one’s sex “with the intent of committing any indecent
or immoral act” failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 136 The
Ohio court noted that the ordinance
goes so far as to bring under suspect the woman who
wears one of her husband’s old shirts to paint lawn
furniture, the trick or treater, the guests at a masquerade party, or the entertainer. Such a standard is
purely subjective and materially fluctuates from person to person. Additionally, the element of an intent
to commit an “indecent” or “immoral” act, while so
dressed, represents an unascertainable standard.137
Despite these well-articulated concerns, clothing remains determinative and inevitable in section 240.37 arrests.138 Allowing this
police practice to continue in LPP policing effectively sanctions a
“fashion police.”139 The problems inherent in allowing policing
based on appearance and clothing are abundant—and then amplified
for marginalized individuals without political power against whom
police do not hesitate to enforce the law.140
A primary component of this is gender itself. If not for prostitution, why else would a woman speak to men, maybe men she did not
know, on the street? Why else would a woman carry condoms or
wear a short skirt? Courts sustain LPP laws and arrests based on an
implicit analysis that certain women on certain streets at certain
times wearing certain clothing talking to certain others could only
be doing so for the purpose of prostitution.141
Of course, this analysis would be incomplete if it did not also
rest on race and class. Why else would this woman be on this street
if not to prostitute? This woman is almost always a woman of color
and this street is always a community where residents are people of
136

City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 464 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974).
Id. at 466.
138
See Ginia Bellafante, Arrests by the Fashion Police, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5,
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/nyregion/arrests-by-the-fashionpolice.html.
139
Id.; see also Cortés, supra note 13.
140
See Cortés, supra note 13.
141
See, e.g., People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1036–37 (N.Y. 1978).
137
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color.142 Because this analysis is implicit, it is not easily discerned
or reflected within the four corners of court decisions or rulings.
Courts further feel comfortable dismissing arguments of discriminatory enforcement or unconstitutionality because they grant
wide deference to police.143 Courts urge us to rest assured that police
will be objective in their enforcement of LPP laws because of officers’ “training and experience . . . .”144 Countless criminal court complaints contain this precise language.145 Officers must know and understand gender expression, appearance, and sexual behavior. But
police are not able to sort behavior meant to signal commercial sex
from other innocent non-criminal expression, even with specific expertise.146
Why do LPP laws stand apart from other types of loitering, or
even cross-dressing, laws that courts have invalidated? The only
plausible hypothesis is the tacit acceptance that LPP laws will only
be used in certain places against certain individuals and, therefore,
do not run the danger that other statutes might. The objectivity
courts read into LPP statutes is reinforced by constructs of privilege,
142

See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2043–44 (2017); see also People v. Martinez, 34
N.Y.S.3d 558, 559–60 (N.Y. App. Term. 2016) (accusatory instrument sufficient
to allege section 240.37 where arresting officer concluded, “based upon his training and experience with regard to prostitution-related offenses that [the arrested
individual] was loitering for the purpose of prostitution”).
144
People v. Farra S., No. 2004 CN 003119, WL 1258162, at *5 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. June 1, 2004).
145
See, e.g., Criminal Court Complaint, July 21, 2018, supra note 83, at 2. In
fact, this language has been explicitly sanctioned by the New York Court of Appeals as it pertains to the validity of accusatory instruments. See People v. Dumas,
497 N.E.2d 686, 686 (N.Y. 1986) (complaint insufficient where “no allegation
that the police officer is an expert in identifying marihuana”); see also People v.
Nunn, 882 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2009) (describing how after People
v. Dumas, “all complaints filed in Criminal Court now contain what has come to
be called the ‘Dumas language’—that is, a statement detailing the Police Officer’s
training and experience in the identification of controlled substances”). In the section 240.37 context, see, for example, Farra S., WL 1258162, at *1, for a discussion of how an accusatory instrument alleging section 240.37 was sufficient where
arresting officer was “experienced in the field of prostitution crimes.” See also
Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution,
32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 345 (2005).
146
See Struening, supra note 2, at 29–30.
143
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misogyny, and whiteness.147 Whereas courts may be concerned
about wives painting lawn furniture or trick-or-treaters,148 decades
of LPP enforcement have assured that enforcement will not inadvertently fall on anyone but intended subjects.149 Courts interpret
vagueness challenges differently when they can foresee a statute’s
wrongful application in communities of privilege and wealth or
communities they deem less plagued with undesirable behavior or
simply undesirable people.150
This phenomenon plays out in the way the law looks at women
who have previously been arrested for prostitution offenses. Police
forms expressly invite officers to check a box indicating that an individual has previously been arrested for a prostitution offense, a
basis for a section 240.37 arrest.151 Notably, the form contemplates
mere arrests for prostitution regardless of whether the arrest results
in a finding of guilt.152 Courts sanction this practice, even though
evidence of prior bad acts or prior arrests seeking to prove someone’s propensity to engage in certain conduct is generally inadmissible in other contexts.153
147

See Bellafante, supra note 4.
The policing of female sexuality is something bourgeois
women talk about often, with little understanding that what exists largely in the realm of metaphor for them remains, for poor
women, a very literal and criminalizing surveillance of how
they present themselves when they leave the house . . . .Just as
it is unthinkable that the same strictures would apply to a black
man drinking a tallboy on a sidewalk in East New York and a
private equity investor having a glass of pinot noir on his stoop
on East 93rd Street, it is inconceivable that a woman in Chelsea
would be stopped by the police on her way to Barry’s Bootcamp
in cropped leggings and a sports bra.

Id.
148

See City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ohio Mun. Ct.

1974).
149
150
151

See Bellafante, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Adams, 330 N.E.2d at 466.
See Supporting Deposition – Loitering for Prostitution, supra note 107, at

2.
152

Id.
See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293–95 (N.Y. 1901) (evidence of a
defendant’s uncharged crimes or prior misconduct is not admissible if it cannot
logically be connected to some specific material issue in the case, and tends only
153
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Additionally, the D.H. court found that the plaintiffs did not
have standing for injunctive relief because they had failed to prove
the imminence of their injury.154 The plaintiffs argued that it was
likely they would be wrongfully arrested again under section 240.37
in three ways: (1) the NYPD used section 240.37 to arrest individuals with prior prostitution-related arrests merely on the basis of those
prior arrests without additional probable cause; (2) several of the
plaintiffs had experienced subsequent arrests and interactions with
the police; and (3) the NYPD engaged in “sweeps” to arrest specific
groups of people, like transgender women socializing in a particular
area.155
Despite the fact that one of the police officer-defendants had explicitly warned a plaintiff that if he “saw girls like them outside after
midnight” in the future he would arrest them, the court found the
allegations too remote and attenuated from the “pivotal” question of
imminent injury.156 It is difficult to reconcile this, too, with the foreshadowing of Papachristou, where the Supreme Court warned that
“[a]rresting a person on suspicion, like arresting a person for investigation, is foreign to our system, even when the arrest is for past
criminality.”157
On the question of discrimination on the basis of gender identity,
several transgender plaintiffs described how the police misgendered
them, referred to them as “he/she,” and inappropriately asked questions about their sex organs.158 In defending the police action, the
City argued this did not sufficiently establish discriminatory animus.
Instead, these “post-hoc gender references” were “rude” but not substantial enough to support a plausible inference that the decision to
arrest any plaintiff was motivated by discriminatory animus.159 The
to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged); see also
People v. Rojas, 760 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (N.Y. 2001) (“[A] criminal case should
be tried on the facts and not on the basis of a defendant’s propensity to commit
the crime charged.”); FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
154
D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 66–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
155
Id. at 64, 66.
156
Id. at 66–67.
157
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972).
158
D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 132, 168, 185.
159
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Partial Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 19, D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp.
3d 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 1:16-cv-07698-PKC-KNF).
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D.H. court agreed that these allegations did not support a plausible
inference of targeting based on gender identity.160
The D.H. court also found that statistics showing arrest disparities based on race and gender were not enough to show intentional
discrimination.161 Accordingly, the court dismissed nearly all of the
plaintiffs’ claims.162
Constitutional challenges aside, one might assume that, if the
policing is as lawless as described above, prosecutors or courts will
offer some check on the practice. Certainly, there is a way in which
problematic arrests could be identified, and addressed, post-arrest.163 Of course, this would not obviate the harmful consequences
of an arrest itself but could potentially provide some protection to
individuals arrested unlawfully.
In theory, prosecutors could decline to prosecute NYPD’s section 240.37 arrests. The first place one might expect a check on
problematic policing is in prosecutors who, post-arrest, are responsible for commencing criminal actions and drawing up accusatory
instruments.164 Yet, as the cervix example demonstrates, prosecutors
frequently offer minimal, if any, screening of cases or protection
against bad arrests.165 The tendency is simply to write up cases,

160

D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 75.
Id. at 78–79. There are many reasons that it is difficult to prove intentional
discrimination and racial profiling by the police. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Testing
Racial Profiling: Empirical Assessment of Disparate Treatment by Police, 2016
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 485, 492.
162
D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 82.
163
See, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 145, at 315.
164
See K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice
in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 286,
306 (2014). It is worth noting here, as explored more in Part III, that at the time
of writing, at least two elected prosecutors in New York City have demonstrated
support for eradicating prosecution of LPP cases. See David Brand & Emma
Whitford, Brooklyn DA, Others Urge Albany to Repeal Loitering Law and Enable
Record-Clearing for Trafficking Victims Before End of Session, BROOKLYN
DAILY
EAGLE
(June
19,
2019),
https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/06/19/brooklyn-da-others-urge-albany-to-repeal-loitering-law-and-enable-record-clearing-for-trafficking-victims-before-end-of-session/. This is significant, given that over the years arrests under section 240.37 have largely been
constrained to five New York City precincts. See Cleary Gottlieb & Legal Aid
Press Release, supra note 38.
165
Zeidman, supra note 145, at 349.
161
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initiate prosecutions, and let everything sort itself out in the adjudication process.166
Then, once a prosecution commences, adjudicating courts fail to
provide safeguards against police abuse under section 240.37.167
Although criminal court arraignments are meant to ensure that arrests, and resulting prosecutions, are premised on reasonable
cause,168 arraignments are largely pro forma and rarely involve examination of the underlying circumstances of an arrest.169 Courts
have the authority to dismiss accusatory instruments that fail to establish a criminal offense.170 Courts could acquit individuals
charged at trial.171 But, the nature of misdemeanor criminal court
practice is such that low-level criminal case adjudication actually
precludes any safeguards against the type of policing described in
Part I.172
As Issa Kohler-Hausmann persuasively argues, factual adjudication simply is not the function of misdemeanor courts in New
York City.173 Rather, under the managerial model of case processing, minor offenses are handled in such a way as to mark, sort,
and monitor individuals arrested in order to set the stage for future
166

See generally Anjali Pathmanathan, The Myth of Preliminary Due Process
for Misdemeanor Prosecutions in New York, 42 HARBINGER 82, 85 (2018) (“Regrettably, however, the New York State Criminal Procedure Law (C.P.L.) fails to
protect individuals accused of misdemeanors from unexamined and oftentimes
unsupportable accusations.”).
167
Zeidman, supra note 145, at 323.
168
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40 (Consol. 2020).
169
See Zeidman, supra note 145, at 345.
170
Criminal courts are empowered to do this as early as arraignment, the first
court appearance on a criminal action. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.45 (Consol.
2020). Section 140.45 of the Criminal Procedure Law requires a local criminal
court to dismiss an accusatory instrument when it is facially insufficient and when
“the court is satisfied that on basis of the available facts or evidence it would be
impossible to draw and file an accusatory instrument which is sufficient on its
face.” Id.; see also People v. Machado, 698 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1999).
171
Most subsections of P.L. 240.37 are Class B misdemeanors or violations
that, when prosecuted within New York City, are tried without a jury pursuant to
C.P.L. § 340.40. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (Consol. 2020); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 340.40 (Consol. 2020).
172
See, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 145, at 321.
173
See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS
AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 72–73 (2018).
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contacts with the criminal legal system.174 Rarely, if ever, are the
merits of an arrest scrutinized or facts found in accordance with the
burdens and standards due process requires.175
Yet, the D.H. court rested on the notion that reviewing courts
would serve as a safeguard against “mistaken[]” arrests under section 240.37.176 In upholding the statute, the court found it provided
“‘define[d] boundaries sufficiently distinct’ for . . . juries, and appellate judges.”177 This reasoning contemplates a review of the validity of arrests that rarely, if ever, occurs in petty offense case adjudication.178
Even in the few instances where an arrested individual challenges the validity of their arrest and prosecution, outcomes vary.179
Consider, for example, how criminal courts evaluate the sufficiency
of accusatory instruments charging section 240.37.180 Courts could
rightfully take issue with the sparseness of allegations giving rise to
LPP arrests considering the multiple innocent explanations for the
conduct that forms the basis of a prosecution or the overall impossibility of establishing that someone’s purpose was, in fact,

174

Id. at 79.
Id.; see also LISA LINDSAY, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK:
ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 25, 49 (Justin Barry ed., 2018),
https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFs/COURTS/nyc/criminal/2017-AnnualReport.pdf (with nearly 200,000 misdemeanor arrests in New York City in 2017,
there were only 645 trials on the merits, only 175 of which were jury trials).
176
D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
177
Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)).
178
Id.
179
Zeidman, supra note 145, at 320.
180
C.P.L. 170.35 authorizes courts to dismiss accusatory instruments that fail
to comply with C.P.L. 100.40, the section that requires that accusatory instruments establish every element of, and provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed, the charged offense. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.35
(Consol. 2020); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40 (Consol. 2020).
175
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prostitution.181 Instead, courts grant wide deference to police in LPP
arrests.182 Appellate courts offer little additional protection.183
The long line of vagueness cases take notice of exactly this
point.184 The Supreme Court in Papachristou went back to 1876 to
decry the danger of impermissibly vague statutes that allow police
to catch the widest nets possible and then
leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could
rightfully be detained, and who should be set at
large. . . . While that was a federal case, the due process implications are equally applicable to the States
and to this vagrancy ordinance. Here the net cast is
large, not to give the courts the power to pick and
choose but to increase the arsenal of the police.185
Put simply, it is difficult to conceive of an instance where an
accusatory instrument charging section 240.37 could sustain reasonable cause that someone has committed a criminal offense.186 Yet,

181

See Struening, supra note 2, at 29–30.
See, e.g., Decision & Order at 2, People v. Guzman, No. 2018CK002552
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. Jan. 30, 2019) (accusatory instrument charging section 240.37
was sufficient where, inter alia, “the officer knows the location as a place where
the New York City Police Department has made numerous arrests for prostitution
related offenses” and “based on the officer’s training and experience, he believes
the defendant was loitering for the purpose of prostitution and not engaging in
another activity, such as panhandling or squeegeeing”).
183
In a 2016 decision, the New York intermediate appellate court considered
three consolidated cases—the individual charged had been arrested under section
240.37 by officers in the same precinct three times only weeks apart. People v.
Martinez, 34 N.Y.S.3d 558, 560 (N.Y. App. Term. 2016). She pleaded guilty to
each offense. Id. at 559–60. In assessing the challenges to the sufficiency of the
complaints, the court vacated two convictions, but sustained the third, finding the
allegations sufficient to support a conviction where police observed the arrested
individual for a few minutes. Id. at 560. The accusatory instrument in the case
established that she “‘attempted to stop 3 male passersby and 3 male motorists’;
that the arresting officer ‘has seen the defendant . . . on other occasions engaging
in the same conduct’ and ‘previously arrested defendant for a prostitution related
offense.’” Id.
184
See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165 (1972).
185
Id. (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186
See Struening, supra note 2, at 29–30.
182
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cases are routinely prosecuted, and people face all the attendant consequences of even a low-level criminal prosecution.187
Additionally, since 2013, prostitution-related offenses in New
York City and other parts of the state are diverted into diversion
courts that further distance adjudication of the case from an evaluation of the circumstances of the arrest.188 When cases are adjudicated in diversion courts, there is a strong incentive for prosecuted
individuals to agree to program dispositions that preclude the possibility of a trial on the merits.189 Individuals can avoid a criminal
conviction or certain sentences if they participate in court-mandated
programming.190 As a result, since 2013, virtually no LPP cases proceeded to trial in New York.191 Arresting officers do not have to
justify the LPP arrests they make.192 They are not held accountable
as they do not have to testify as to the details of an arrest or explain
the factors on which they rely.193 Criminal courts rarely, if ever, explore the underlying circumstances of an arrest so as to offer any
protection or oversight.194 Section 240.37 arrests in New York remain insulated from review.195
Accordingly, whether in civil litigation or through the adjudication of individual criminal cases, courts do not provide adequate
safeguards against the type of discriminatory policing facilitated by

187
See, e.g., Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 818–19,
821–22 (2015); Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor
Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 735 (2018).
188
See Aya Gruber et al., Penal Welfare and the New Human Trafficking Intervention Courts, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2016); GLOB. HEALTH JUSTICE
P’SHIP, UN-MEETABLE PROMISES: RHETORIC AND REALITY IN NEW YORK CITY’S
HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
INTERVENTION
COURTS
23,
25
(2018),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/unmeetable_promises_htic_report_ghjp_2018rev.pdf.
189
Melissa Gira Grant, Human Trafficking Courts Are Not a Criminal Justice
“Innovation,” NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 7, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/156135/human-trafficking-courts-not-criminal-justice-innovation.
190
Gruber et al., supra note 188, at 1366–67.
191
Id. at 1364.
192
Cf. id. at 1362.
193
Cf. id.
194
See Zeidman, supra note 145, at 320–21.
195
Id.
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LPP laws.196 Where does that leave those in danger of subjective
enforcement and wrongful arrest?
PART III
Over the last several years, the numbers of LPP arrests across
New York State have generally decreased.197 Some police precincts
or departments have chosen non-enforcement and a few prosecutors
have decided as a matter of policy not to prosecute LPP arrests.198
Yet, the existence of the statutes themselves remain dangerous and
problematic. As detailed above in Part II, arrest practice under section 240.37 can be revived at any time and for any purpose. The
increase in arrests in 2018 noted above bears this out.199
As a new decade dawns, New York finds itself in a particular
political and historical moment. Broken windows policing, the highvolume low-level offense policing strategy that dominated over two
decades, has been declared over,200 disavowed,201 and even the subject of political apologies.202 Civil rights advocates have fought
196

Id.
See Top Arrest Charge, supra note 63.
198
See, e.g., Cyrus Vance, Jr. (@ManhattanDA), TWITTER (June 19, 2019,
7:10 PM), https://twitter.com/ManhattanDA/status/1141483438337351682 (“We
support vacating convictions for trafficking survivors and repealing the crime of
‘Loitering for Prostitution,’ which disproportionately impacts LGBTQ New
Yorkers and does not make us safer. We have not charged this offense for several
years. #CJreform #WalkingWhileTrans.”); see also Brand & Whitford, supra note
164.
199
See Top Arrest Charge, supra note 63.
200
See, e.g., Jacob Gershman, Arrests for Low-Level Crimes Are Plummeting,
and the Experts Are Flummoxed, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 6, 2019, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/arrests-for-low-level-crimes-are-plummeting-andthe-experts-are-flummoxed-11570354201?shareToken=st821b6493f33649b88804c41ce752149d; see also Greg Berman, Why We
Need to Rethink Misdemeanor Justice, GOVERNING (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/col-why-we-need-rethink-misdemeanor-justice.html.
201
C.J. Ciaramella, George Kelling, Father of ‘Broken Windows’ Policing,
Dies, REASON (May 17, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://reason.com/2019/05/17/georgekelling-father-of-broken-windows-policing-dies/.
202
See, e.g., Shane Goldmacher, Michael Bloomberg Pushed ‘Stop-andFrisk’ Policing. Now He’s Apologizing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2019),
197
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relentlessly to eradicate the NYPD’s unlawful stop-and-frisk practice and have made significant gains, including a court finding that
the practice was unconstitutional,203 federal court monitoring,204 and
a significant decrease in reported stops.205 Although much work remains to undo the harm caused by years of these policing regimes,
political discourse has unquestionably shifted.206
Against this backdrop, it is even more perplexing that section
240.37 is still allowed to threaten women of color and gender nonconforming individuals in New York City. In this post-broken-windows, post-stop-and-frisk era, LPP laws remain in place and sanction police abuse in street-based encounters.207 LPP laws codify gender policing in petty offense enforcement and need to be understood
for what they are—gendered stop-and-frisk.
Section 240.37 sanctions harmful police encounters that have
purportedly fallen out of favor.208 More alarming still are recent efforts in other places across the country to enact new LPP laws like
section 240.37. For example, in June 2018, as the NYPD was making its patrol guide changes, the Chicago City Council passed a new

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/us/politics/michael-bloombergspeech.html.
203
See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 625–46 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
204
See, e.g., Al Baker, Police Evaluations Should Focus on Lawfulness of
Stops, Monitor Says, N.Y. Times (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/nyregion/new-york-police-evaluations-stops-monitor.html.
205
A 2019 report by the New York Civil Liberties Union establishes that the
“number of reported NYPD stops has drastically declined since 2011, the height
of stop-and-frisk in New York City.” N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-ANDFRISK IN THE DE BLASIO ERA 2 (2019), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/20190314_nyclu_stopfrisk_singles.pdf. “In 2017,
11,629 stops were reported, marking a 98 percent decrease from the number reported in 2011.” Id.
206
Id.
207
See, e.g., ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE
AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR 149 (2017); see also Julia Dahl,
You Say Loitering for Sex, I Say Just Hanging Out, SALON (Aug. 30, 2010, 3:01
PM), https://www.salon.com/2010/08/30/prostitution_zone_constitutional/.
208
See Brand & Whitford, supra note 164.
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ordinance outlawing “prostitution-related loitering.”209 The ordinance was passed even though civil rights advocates condemned it
because it “throws open the door to rampant racial profiling of Black
women, women of color, queer and trans people, and anyone else
whose presence in public spaces is presumed to signal an intent to
trade sex.”210
Similar patterns emerge everywhere LPP laws are enforced,
from Phoenix, Arizona,211 to Columbus, Georgia.212 Across the
country, transgender women, homeless women, and women who
have previously been arrested for prostitution experience repeated
arrests.213 Police use LPP laws to arrest women who even turn down
offers for sex for money and use resources for operations that net
additional LPP arrests.214 New Jersey’s LPP law mirrors New
York’s almost to the letter as it criminalizes “wander[ing] . . . in a
public place with the purpose of engaging in prostitution.”215 There,

209

CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-016 (2019); see also Jonah Newman &
Nikki Baim, Prostitution-Loitering Law Likely to Target Women of Color for Arrest, CHI. REP. (July 24, 2018), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/prostitution-loitering-ordinance-likely-to-target-women-of-color-for-arrest/.
210
Andrea J. Ritchie & Brit Schulte, “Prostitution-Related” Loitering Ordinance Promotes Racial Profiling in Chicago, TRUTHOUT (July 24, 2018),
https://truthout.org/articles/anti-prostitution-ordinance-promotes-racial-profiling-in-chicago/ (noting that “[s]imilar laws in California, New York and Washington, DC, have also long been the subject of controversy and challenges claiming that they facilitate profiling and discriminatory and abusive enforcement.”).
211
See, e.g., James Nichols, Monica Jones, Transgender Woman, Convicted
of ‘Manifesting Prostitution’, HUFFPOST (Apr. 16, 2014, 11:14 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/monica-jones-transgender_n_5159638?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAJOxwvnrxgxck9_-l0ae7j1B6zUfurLulz5NELJUtlgpgPE8SCGTCiiidAaL1NgiH7RKEtNakcBndhtCO6lhsBd_NBqqlZib6nP0YEfi7oRclFIAdeS0RPZM_ZzR1sa_OQ4Z9f4TJAFw_cqrngbmEqSBEM_FJb9z0aZ-i_VzcHb.
212
See, e.g., Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Profiling and Prostitution Pre-Crime in
Georgia, REASON (August 8, 2017), https://reason.com/2017/08/08/loitering-forpurpose-of-prostitution/.
213
See, e.g., RITCHIE, supra note 207, at 149; see also Dahl, supra note 207.
214
See Brown, supra note 212.
215
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1.1 (West 2019).
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as in New York, “stereotypes are oftentimes the only way to enforce
such a vague statute.”216
Elected officials cling to LPP laws as they allow for easy and
quick ways to clean up public streets in the face of complaints by
constituents or, more commonly, constituent businesses.217 It is so
commonly accepted that LPP arrests can be made without probable
cause that the incoming Milwaukee city prosecutor recently published an op-ed explaining how he would utilize Milwaukee’s broad
LPP statute.218 He distinguished LPP enforcement from that targeting actual acts of prostitution or commercial sex, noting that “[a]
police officer needs a clear indication that a person is offering a sexual act for a thing of value before he/ she can arrest someone for
prostitution. However, that is not the case with the city ordinance,
Loitering (Prostitution Related).”219
Fortunately, in the face of these ongoing and flagrant constitutional abuses, there is now a growing movement organizing against
abusive LPP laws and their impact on specific communities.220
Across the country, youth, trans advocates, and sex workers are putting pressure on lawmakers to reexamine LPP laws.221
A few weeks after the decision dismissing the majority of plaintiff’s claims in D.H., two New York legislators introduced a bill that
would completely repeal section 240.37.222 The bill’s justification
cited the D.H. plaintiffs’ experience and claims, noting that

216
Derek J. Demeri, Opinion, Transgender People Are Being Profiled as Sex
Workers. AG’s Directive Fails to Address the Issue, NJ.COM (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.nj.com/opinion/2019/12/transgender-people-are-being-profiled-assex-workers-ags-directive-fails-to-address-the-issue-opinion.html.
217
See Struening, supra note 2, at 19–20.
218
See Vince Bobot, Human Trafficking: What Can the City Attorney Do
About It?, MILWAUKEE COURIER (Jan. 3, 2020), https://milwaukeecourieronline.com/index.php/2020/01/03/human-trafficking-what-can-the-city-attorney-do-about-it/.
219
Id.
220
See, e.g., Klepper, supra note 35; Alanna Vagianos, Civil Rights Groups
Call out ‘Archaic’ N.Y. Loitering Law for Targeting Trans People, HUFFPOST
(June 12, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/civil-rights-groupscall-out-archaic-ny-loitering-law-for-targeting-trans-people_n_5d00067ae4b011df123c0fd1.
221
See, e.g., Ritchie & Schulte, supra note 210.
222
See State Assemb. A09704A, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018).
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[a]rrests under Section 240.37 disproportionately impact women, particularly cisgender and transgender
women of color and women who have previously
been arrested for prostitution offenses. Eighty-five
percent of the individuals arrested under Section
240.37 between 2012-2015 were Black or Latina. In
particular, women of color have often been unlawfully targeted by officers under this statute during
“sweeps” or “operations” where officers arrest large
numbers of women in a given area at the same
time.223
In the 2018 session, the bill did not reach a floor vote in either
chamber, but in 2019 the effort to repeal section 240.37 coalesced
into a broader movement.224 An advocacy coalition centering the
people most directly impacted by the law’s enforcement catalyzed a
groundswell of support.225 The new movement has coined section
240.37 as the “Walking While Trans Ban,”226 and emphasized that
its repeal would be “life-saving” for trans communities.227 On November 20, 2019, the Transgender Day of Remembrance, groups
rallied to raise awareness of the importance of repealing section

223
A09704 Memo: New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation,
N.Y.
ST.
ASSEMBLY,
https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A09704&term=2017&Memo=Y (last visited Apr. 8,
2020).
224
In 2018, the Assembly Codes Committee voted favorably on A09704, but
the bill did not reach a floor vote in the Assembly. See A09704 Committee Votes
and Floor Votes, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY, https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A09704&term=2017&Committee%26nbspVotes=Y&Floor%26nbspVotes=Y (last visited Apr. 8, 2020). The
State Senate, still Republican-controlled at that time, took no action on the Senate
version. See S08107 Summary and Actions, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY, https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=S08107&term=2017&Summary=Y&Actions=Y (last visited Apr. 8, 2020).
225
See Klepper, supra note 35 (“More than 100 current and former sex workers rallied at New York’s Capitol on Tuesday to encourage lawmakers to repeal a
loitering law they say police use to harass people simply for their appearance.”).
226
See id.
227
See Vagianos, supra note 220.
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240.37.228 Several transgender women who had been arrested under
section 240.37 described “near-constant harassment from the NYPD
based on their appearance as trans women of color.”229
The repeal campaign’s progress in the 2019 legislative session
included the public support of two prominent elected District Attorneys, Cyrus Vance of New York County and Eric Gonzalez of Kings
County.230 The New York County District Attorney’s Office had
ceased prosecuting section 240.37 arrests a year earlier.231 The
Kings County District Attorney’s Office has likewise demonstrated
support for eradicating prosecution of LPP cases.232
The repeal effort also has the backing of major civil rights organizations, law professors, and grassroots organizations.233 Advocates emphasize how long New Yorkers have suffered discriminatory, and unnecessary, enforcement under section 240.37.234 Although it is always difficult to predict how legislatures will act on
criminal law and policing issues, momentum is building and organizers are demanding change.235

Zoë Beery, Transgender New Yorkers Rally to End ‘Stop and Frisk for
Trans Women,’ GOTHAMIST (Nov. 20, 2019, 10:48 AM), https://gothamist.com/news/transgender-new-yorkers-rally-end-stop-and-frisk-trans-women.
229
Id.
230
See Brand & Whitford, supra note 164.
231
See Vance, supra note 198 (“We support vacating convictions for trafficking survivors and repealing the crime of ‘Loitering for Prostitution,’ which disproportionately impacts LGBTQ New Yorkers and does not make us safer. We
have not charged this offense for several years. #CJreform #WalkingWhileTrans.”); see also Press Release, N.Y. Cty. Dist. Attorney, D.A. Vance and 66
Criminal Justice Leaders Denounce U.S. Attorney General’s Remarks About Local Prosecutors (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.manhattanda.org/d-a-vance-and66-criminal-justice-leaders-denounce-u-s-attorney-generals-remarks-about-local-prosecutors/.
232
See Brand & Whitford, supra note 164.
233
See, e.g., Avery McNeil & Breanne Chappell, Opinion, Repeal the New
York Loitering Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/opinion/letters/new-york-state-loitering-law.html; Memorandum of Support for A00654/S02253 from Criminal Law Professors in N.Y.
State (Apr. 2019) (on file with author); Memorandum of Support for
A00654/S02253 from Human Rights Watch (Mar. 22, 2019) (on file with author).
234
See, e.g., McNeil & Chappell, supra note 233.
235
See, e.g., Ritchie & Schulte, supra note 210.
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CONCLUSION
Although the renewed recent challenge to section 240.37
through litigation was unsuccessful, there are lessons to be gleaned
from where we have landed over forty years after the law’s passage.
The vague provisions of the law have proved impervious to constitutional attack precisely because section 240.37 rests on archaic
norms involving gender and sex.236 Courts countenance sexism, racism, and classism so naturalized that it passes as objective.237 In this
way, courts adjudicating criminal cases or hearing constitutional
challenges fortify harmful entrenched policing rather than act as a
check on police practices.238
LPP arrests today look exactly like those of the 1970s, when the
law was first passed, and like those of the 1990s and early 2000s, at
the height of broken windows policing.239 Enforcement of the statute has unfolded exactly as anticipated. Court challenges have failed
to protect against discrimination and abuse.240
As part of a larger paradigm shift toward reducing the reach and
impact of the criminal legal system, an abolitionist approach is necessary when it comes to LPP policing. Abolition does not mean less
policing, decreased enforcement, or reform in arrest procedure itself. Instead, the solution lies in repeal of the law. Taking LPP laws
like section 240.37 out of the police arsenal would work to eliminate
policing based on gender, gender-identity, and the enforcement of
misogynist gender norms.
Were section 240.37 to be repealed, many questions would remain. Without a doubt, there are battles left to fight against the over
policing of women of color, sex workers, and trans and gender nonconforming individuals.241 There are myriad other ways gender and
gender expression are criminalized, particularly in conjunction with
race and class.242 If section 240.37 did not exist, would the policing
simply shift elsewhere, utilizing another penal law section? Perhaps.
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Would police find another tool to control public spaces and sexual
behavior? It is possible. Yet, that threat alone should not preclude
rational action now.
Repealing section 240.37 would unequivocally express that the
harms caused by its enforcement far outweigh any benefit of its continued use. Taking the law off the books would show that the experience of those profiled, harassed, arrested, or criminalized under the
vague statute is worthy of reparation. Police should no longer be
empowered to arrest a woman because they claim her cervix was
showing, nor should a nun’s outfit be the only clothing a woman can
wear that does not put her at risk of arrest. Repealing section 240.37
would be a first step in stopping police harassment of women and
gender non-conforming individuals in public spaces and condemning what has proven to be gendered stop-and-frisk.

